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Index overstock
the safest path to stock market success, in-
vestors have often been told, is to diversify—to 
invest in different stocks representing the whole
market. But by so often choosing index funds,
perhaps we are heeding that advice too well.
Unlike typical mutual funds, index funds invest
in all the components of a stock index (the Dow
Jones Industrials or the S&P 500, for example)
and thereby closely duplicate the index’s returns.
Because of their inherent diversification and low
administrative costs, index funds have skyrocket-
ed in popularity since their 1976 debut.
But a recent study by Randall Morck and Fan
Yang finds that stocks included in market indexes
may be overvalued relative to similar excluded
stocks. Index membership increases the demand
for stocks in the index as fund
managers and diversity-seek-
ing investors buy more
shares. Since the number of
shares issued is relatively
fixed, the prices of stocks in
the index go up.
Worse, Morck and Yang
fear that the popularity of in-
dex funds caused an “indexing bubble” mirroring
the “tech bubble” of the late 1990s. More than just
an overvaluation, a bubble could occur if investors
bought index-included stocks as much for their
perceived propensity to continue increasing as for
their underlying value. As the stock prices of firms
included in the index increase, demand for those
stocks rises, further increasing their price. The au-
thors conclude that in 2001, the values of stocks
included in the S&P 500 were as much as 90 per-
cent above those for similarly sized companies not
included in the index—a premium far in excess of
what would be considered merely “overvalued.” 
Normally, investors sell overvalued stocks and
buy their undervalued peers, eventually bringing
prices back into line. But the popularity of index
funds has made this almost impossible. Index
funds are still attracting investors even as stock
market investment overall has declined in the last
three years. As a result, the premium on index
funds, though diminished, has persisted. Morck
and Yang point out, however, that if investors
found alternative ways of diversifying and index-
ing became less popular, then the prices of a num-
ber of prominent stocks could fall sharply. Until
then, the prices of indexed stocks will likely con-
tinue to command a premium. —Matt Rutledge
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according to conventional wisdom, globalization
is about breaking down national borders. Indeed, it is
often argued that growing economic integration and
interdependence lead to more open borders and more
harmonious cross-border relations. President Vicente
Fox of Mexico, a leading proponent of this view, took
office in December 2000 promoting a bold vision of an
open U.S.-Mexico border, including the free move-
ment of labor and the creation of a North American
community. Such a proposal would further advance the
process of continental integration. With the U.S.-
Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders already the two
busiest land crossings in the world, U.S.-Mexico trade






off be in our
future? doubled since the start of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.
Fox’s border-free vision of North America was one of the first
casualties of the devastating terrorist attacks on the Twin Tow-
ers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In both political
debates and policy practice, the events of that day raised fears
and put borders very much back in style, as the United States
began a dramatic tightening of border inspections as part of its
new and expanding war on terrorism. Traditional border issues,
such as trade and migration, would now be inescapably evalu-
ated through a security lens.
But the cross-border transportation and communications
networks used by terrorists are also the arteries of a highly in-
tegrated and interdependent economy. Currently, about one-
quarter of all U.S. production for export (2.5 percent of U.S.
gross domestic product) goes to Canada and 15 percent is des-
tined for Mexico. Constricting the arteries that facilitate this
trade increases the cost of the cross-border flow of people and
goods, with significant economic repercussions for ourselves
and our trading partners. Similarly, the way in which border
controls are implemented and managed could reduce the ben-
efits of open borders and significantly affect the future of North
American economic integration. Notes Stephen Flynn, a senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. prosperity—
and much of its power—relies on its ready access to North
America and global networks of transport, energy, information,
finance, and labor. It [would be] self-defeating for the United
States to embrace security measures that isolate it from these
networks.”
BORDER CONTROLS BEFORE AND AFTER 9-11
Before the attacks on 9-11, U.S. border enforcement over-
whelmingly focused on inhibiting the flow of illegal drugs and
immigrants. The enforcement apparatus of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) was designed to handle millions
of migrant workers entering the country in search of employ-
ment rather than to detect a few individuals who arrive to com-
mit terrorist acts. Counterterrorism had traditionally been a low
priority. Similarly, the U.S. Customs Service focused its ener-
gy on controlling the entry of illegal drugs into the country, and
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the Coast Guard concentrated on interdicting illegal drugs and
immigrants. If the efficacy of these efforts was and continues
to be controversial, perhaps one reason is that border enforce-
ment efforts have sought to project the image of heightened se-
curity while not substantially slowing legitimate cross-border
flows of people and goods. 
Also, prior to 9-11 most enforcement activity centered on the
U.S.-Mexico border, while the U.S.-Canada border was bare-
ly policed—only 334 agents were assigned to the 5,525-mile
northern border compared with over 9,000 agents stationed at
the 2,062-mile southern edge. Even during the 1990s, when the
INS budget tripled and the size of the U.S. Border Patrol dou-
bled, attention remained almost exclusively directed at the U.S.-
Mexico border. On September 11, 2001, there were as many
Border Patrol agents in Brownsville, Texas, as along the entire
U.S.-Canada border. 
The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon com-
plicated business as usual along both U.S. borders. The im-
mediate U.S. response included increasing spending on border
security and a dramatic tightening of inspections. The 2003 fed-
eral budget provided for a more than $2 billion increase in bor-
der security funds, including a 29 percent increase for the INS,
a 36 percent increase in the inspections budget of the Customs
Service, and the largest budget increase in the Coast Guard’s
history. Moreover, these agencies have now been brought to-
gether and folded into the new Department of Homeland Se-
curity—representing the largest reorganization of the federal
government since the end of World War II. 
One major change was an increased enforcement effort at the
U.S.-Canada border. Under the Patriot Act, the number of
agents deployed at the Canadian border was tripled; the Coast
Guard now stops all boats crossing the Great Lakes and es-
corts gas and oil tankers. For its part, Canada also ordered a high
state of alert at border crossings immediately after the attacks.
Since then, it has enhanced the levels of security at airports,
added new funding for detection technologies and personnel,
initiated legislation to combat the financing of terrorism, and
frozen the assets of known terrorist groups. It also introduced
a fraud-resistant resident card for new immigrants, increased
detention capacity and deportation activity, instituted greater
security screening for refugee claimants, and tightened its visa
regime—including  adding  a  requirement  that  Saudi  and
Malaysian visitors obtain visas.
To a significant degree, these new U.S. border security mea-
sures have consisted of taking the old drug and immigration en-
forcement infrastructure and adapting it to counterterrorism ef-
forts. Yet the counterterrorism mission is far more difficult than
stopping the flow of illegal drugs and immigrants, and the ex-
pectation of success is much higher—indeed, the American
public expects a success rate of 100 percent. And the indica-
tors of success used for traditional border enforcement work,
such as arrests and seizures, are visible and relatively easy to
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use, whereas even counterterrorism “successes” can be infre-
quent and difficult to observe (for example, the attack that does
not take place). In short, border enforcers have been given a
harder job, face higher expectations, and have to rely on more
difficult measures of progress. 
A NEW KIND OF TRADE BARRIER?
As understandable as these border security measures may be,
a sustained crackdown at U.S. land ports of entry risks a con-
siderable impact on legitimate travel and trade. The United
States and Canada conduct $1.3 billion worth of two-way trade
a day, most of which is moved by truck. According to one es-
timate, a truck crosses this border every 2.5 seconds—amount-
ing to 45,000 trucks and 40,000 commercial shipments every
day. Immediately following 9-11 and the ensuing clampdown,
the result was a dramatic slowing of cross-border traffic. Delays
for trucks hauling cargo across the U.S.-Canadian border in-
creased from 1–2 minutes to 10–15 hours, stranding shipments
of parts and perishable goods. Automobile companies, many of
which manufacture parts in Ontario and ship them to U.S. as-
sembly plants on a cost-efficient, just-in-time basis, were par-
ticularly vulnerable. Ford closed an engine plant in Windsor
and a vehicle plant in Michigan due to part shortages. Mas-
sive traffic jams and long delays also characterized the U.S.-
Mexico border, where an estimated 300 million people, 90 mil-
lion cars, and 4.3 million trucks cross the border annually. 
While border delays are now not as long as immediately fol-
lowing the attacks, heightened security concerns can have a
chilling effect on cross-border exchange. Put differently, secu-
rity can become a new kind of trade barrier. Indeed, the United
States’ response immediately after 9-11 was the equivalent of im-
posing a trade embargo on itself, observes Stephen Flynn.
While the long-term process of North American integration has
not been reversed, it has certainly been complicated by the
squeeze on the cross-border transportation arteries that provide
its lifeblood. 
FUTURE BORDER TRAJECTORIES
There are at least three potential future border trajectories in
North America. At one extreme, one can imagine a substantial
hardening of U.S. border defenses with security trumping all
other considerations—the equivalent of a high tariff on the
economies of both the United States and its neighbors. At the
other are multilateral policy harmonization and a “pooling” of
sovereignty similar to that which exists among European Union
members—where common visa and asylum policies, a shared
information system, and standardized border procedures es-
sentially provide a common security perimeter. The most like-
ly scenario for North America lies somewhere in between: a
series of initiatives involving a mixture of enhanced cross-bor-
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As the task of border control becomes more difficult, looking
for answers beyond physical borderlines may be one way to en-
hance security while encouraging economic integration. For ex-
ample, there are a number of innovative new cargo-tracking sys-
tems,  inspection  technologies,  and  traffic  management
strategies that are being promoted to extend policing beyond
the ports of entry. 
These “smart border” measures are designed to both ease
border congestion and enhance security at the same time. For
example, manufacturers and transport companies can beef up
internal security measures to seal their cargo and can use new
information and tracking technologies to assure the account-
ability of drivers and shipments. Regular business travelers can
be prescreened and provided with an identification card with
biometric information (such as handprint or retina information),
and their vehicles can be equipped with electronic transpon-
ders. To facilitate border inspections and ease congestion, pas-
senger information can be transmitted to border agents in ad-
vance. And for cargo, the entire inspection process could even
be pushed away from the physical border into a trilateral con-
tinental inspection facility. 
Balancing the twin policy objectives of border facilitation and
enforcement has always been an awkward and cumbersome
task. Since 9-11, the balancing act has become even more diffi-
cult as we seek ways to advance market integration while also
managing our security and other public policy interests. Al-
though it will likely be impossible to fully reconcile the twin im-
peratives of integration and security, how well we manage this
formidable and inescapable challenge will profoundly shape the
future of cross-border relations in North America. S
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“Smart border” measures can simultaneously enhance
security and encourage economic integration. 
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